OPINION OF THE COURT.

"The laws," says the celebrated BECCARIA, "are always several ages behind the actual improvement of the
nation which they govern." This observation, while true
of law in general, is particularly true of the criminal law.
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PITTS, Special Jfudge.-The Connell-Hall-McLester
Company, a Tennessee mercantile corporation located at
Nashville, executed a general assignment to the Nashville
Trust Company, for the benefit of creditors, on the 4 th day
of June, i39i. The deed of assignment conveyed to the
assignee all the property and assets belonging to the assignor company, schedules being annexed under oath, specifying, among other things, all moneys on deposit in the
Fourth National Bank of Nashville. At the date of the
assignment the assignor company had on deposit, subject
to its check, in said bank, $5,222.66, and the bank held
its four notes for borrowed money, due as follows:
One due July 3, r89 r , for .....

..................

One due July 17, i891, for ................

One due July i9, i891, for .........
One due August 22, i89r, for ..................
Making total of ......

.so,ooo

4,500 00
9,000 00

.. ..

4,500 00

................

....................

oo

. ..

.$28,ooo

oo
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The bank, after the assignment was made and noted for
registration, and on the same day it was made, with knowledge of the assignment, applied said deposit to the credit
of the assignor upon its indebtedness to the bank on the
above-stated notes. Within three days after the assignment
the assignee drew its check upon the bank for the amount
of the deposit, caused the same to be presented for payment, and payment was refused. The assignor is insolvent,
and was insolvent at the date of the assignment, and will
not pay its debts in full. On the 4th day of December,
1891, the assignee and the Fourth National Bank submitted an agreed case to the Chancery Court at Nashville for
decision upon the foregoing facts; the assignee claiming,
as stated in the agreed case, "that it had the right to collect the deposit, and that it still has such right, or, if it
has not this right, that-, in the fro rata distribution of the
proceeds of the assets among the creditors of the ConnellHall-McLester Company, it has the right to charge said
bank with the sum so on deposit and appropriated, as so
much cash, received on its fro rata share of said proceeds
upon its debt of $28,ooo;" and the bank claiming "that
it had the right to appropriate said deposit in payment on
said notes, prove its debt for the balance, and collect its
.ro rata share of the trust fund on said balance as other
creditors, and that it now has such right." These questions were submitted for decision, with the agreement that
costs should be paid by the losing party. The Chancellor
held for the defendant, the bank, grounding his decision
upon the doctrine of equitable set-off, and the complainant
has appealed.
Two questions are now presented for decision. The
first is whether the doctrine of equitable set-off applied,
and gave to the bank, immediately upon the assignment
being made and the insolvency of the assignor established,
the right to have the deposit credited upon or allowed as
a set-off against the indebtedness of the assignor not then
due. The complainant's counsel argues, with much force
and plausibility, that the mere fact that one of the parties
to independent cross-indebtedness is insolvent constitutes
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no ground for equitable set-off; that some connection of
dependence, or "mutual credit," in addition to insolvency,
-is essential; that more especially is this so when the
indebtedness of one of the parties is not due, and that,
too, of the party who is seeking to obtain the set-off; that
to apply the doctrine of set-off to such a case would be to
allow a party to collect a debt before it is due, without the
consent of his debtor, and thus violate the contract which
the parties have made ; and that in this case such a result
would give 'the bank a preference over other creditors of
the assignor, and violates the statute which provides for
the equal firo rala distribution of the assets of insolvent
debtors under general assignments, as well as the like
statutory provisions in regard to -insolvent corporations.
On the other hand, it is argued with equal force and
plausibility for defendant that insolvency is, of itself, a
sufficient ground for equitable set-off, without any connection or "mutual credit" between the debts or parties; that
connection and insolvency are separate and distinct grounds
for such relief, each being alone sufficient; that, where
insolvency exists, it mikes no difference that the indebtedness on one side is not due, nor which party is insolvent,
-whether
the party seeking the set-off or the party
resisting it; that, under the statutes providing for the equal
fpro rata distribution of the assets of insolvent persons and
corporations, the assets of the insolvent, in respect to
choses in action, are only the balances due the insolvent
estate after deducting all proper credits, counterclaims and
set-offs, as its liabilities are only the balances due from it,
ascertained in like manner, and therefore that to allow the
set-off claimed in this case is not to disturb, but to preserve
and enforce, equality among creditors; and that to refuse
it would be to give other creditors a preference over the
bank, and work injustice to the latter by compelling it to
pay jn full what it owes to the insolvent, and take a fifo
rata on what the insolvent owes it.
The second question is, the indebtedness on both sides
,being, due when the agreed case was filed, whether the
bank has the legal right of set-off. On this question, in
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addition to the contentions already suggested, it is insisted
for complainant that the rights of the parties were fixed at
the date of the assignment, and,'the bank having no right
to set-off at that date, it has not such right now; that the
lapse of time did not enlarge defendant's right in this
respect; and that the assignee represents the creditors of
the assignor, and not the assignor only; and therefore that
the assignee is not to be regarded as standing in the shoes
of the assignor simply. On the other hand, it is insisted
for defendant that the assignee takes, not only as a volunteer, subject to all the equities existing against the assignor,
and not as a purchaser for value, but also as the personal
representative of the assignor, and stands for and in .the
place of the assignor in all respects, except as to personal
liability; that the agreed case is, in effect, a suit to recover
the deposit by the Connell-Hall-McLester Company, by its
assignee and personal representative, and that, the debts
being mutual and all due, the bank has the legal right of
set-off to the extent of the deposit.
Opposed as they are to each other, the positions of
counsel are each supported by apparently well-considered
cases on both of the general questions stated; but no adjudication of this Court, upon a similar state of facts, has
been cited, nor is the Court aware of any case in this State
in which the precise questions here raised have been decided. The adjudged cases in this country and in England,
and the text-books founded upon them, are in hopeless and
irreconcilable conflict on many of the points involved.
Any effort to reconcile them would be utterly futile. There
is no touchstone of reason that will distinguish and harmonize them upon any general principle applicable to all
of them, for their antagonism is not apparent, simply, but
real and fundamental. They but furnish one of the many
illustrations of that diversity of judgment which is inherent in the minds of men, which often, out of substantially
similar raw materials and general conditions, has founded
and built up dissimilar systems of jurisprudence, and which
too often proves a delusion and snare to the worshipper of
mere precedent. We must therefore look for guidance to
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our own State on the general subject, and to the principles
involved, which appear to be sustained by reason and the
weight of authority; and, first of all, it must be remembered that the doctrine of set-off, whether legal or equitable, is essentially a doctrine of equity. It was that
natural justice and equity which dictates that the demands
of parties, mutually indebted, should be set off against
each other, and only the balance recovered, that gave birth
to the idea of accomplishing the result in a judicial proceeding. The common law, for simplicity of procedure,
determined otherwise, and held that each claim must be
prosecuted separately. "The natural sense of mankind,"
says Lord MANSFIELD,

"was first shocked at this in the

case of bankrupts; and it was provided for by 4 Anne, Ch.
17, § ii, and 5 Geo. II., Ch. 30, § 28."'' "In pursuance of
these old statutes, and of the dictates of equity," says the
Supreme Court of the United States in Carr v. Hamilton,2
"the principle of set-off between mutual debts and credits
has, for nearly two centuries past, been adopted in the
English bankrupt laws, and has always prevailed in our
own whenever we have had such a law in force on our
statute book; and it mattered not whether the debt was due
at the time of bankruptcy or not, "-citing authorities.
The jurisdiction of courts of equity over the subject
of set-off was exercised before there was any statute upon
the subject,3 and has often been applied in cases not within
the statutes.4 By the civil law, from which the great body
of our system of equity comes, a cross-debt was, by mere
operation of law, without any act of the parties, extinguished. It was treated as an absolute payment. Courts of
equity in this country, while not going so far, have accomplished the same results in numerous cases, by granting
Gree v. Farmer, 4 Burrows,
.

2214, 2220,

cited in 2 Story, Eq. Jur.,

1433.

I. S., 255, 256; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 295.
3 Hawkins v. Freeman, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr., io; Chapman v. Derby, 2
Vern., 117.
4 Williams v. Davis, 2 Sim., 46! ; Exparte Prescott, i Atk., 33 1;
Lanesborough v. Jones, I P. Wins., 326; Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason,
- 129

207.
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perpetual injunctions against judgments in favor of insolvent persons who were indebted in larger amounts to the
judgment debtor,' and inother cases, where, on account
of the non-residence of the judgment plaintiff, or for
other reason, the defendant could not save the demand due
himself except by setting it off against the judgment.'
The Court, in all such cases, is governed, not by the statute
of set-off, but by the general principles of equity, 3 and the
general principle of equitable set-off seems to be alloived
where the party claiming it appears, in good conscience,
to be entitled to it, and no superior equity in favor of the
party resisting it will be thereby defeated.4 The same
author says: "The natural equity, to have mutual, but
unconnected, demands, between two parties who have been
dealing with each other, set off, is, as 'a general rule,
superior to the claim of any other creditor who has not
dealt with the insolvent upon the faith of specific fund
against which the right of set-off is claimed.'
With
these general principles in view, we proceed to examine
the reasons urged in arguments for and against the application of the doctrine of equitable set-off in this case.
And, first, as to the capacity in which the complainant stands before the Court. Is the Nashville Trust Company to be regarded as standing in the shoes of its assignor,
the Cornell-Hall-McLester Company, or upon different and
higher ground? On the first point the authorities are in
harmony; but we are of opinion that reason and the weight
of authority support the view that an assignee for the
benefit of creditors takes the choses in action of his assignor, not as a purchaser for value, but as a volunteer, and
therefore subject to all the defences and equities existing
against them in the hands of the assignor; and not only
so, but that he holds as the representative of the assignor
1 Brazelton v. Brooks, 2 Head, 193; Hough v. Chaffin, 4 Sneed,
238.
2 Gregory v. Hasbrook, i Tenn., Ch. 220; Edminson v. Baxter, 4
Hayw., Tenn., 112; Wvat. Set-off, 0 43r.
Jeffries v. Evans, 43 Amer. Dec., 158.
4 Wat, Set-Off, 439.
5 Ibid., 438.
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and his estate; and in this respect is to be distinguished
from a particular assignee, holding for himself, either asvolunteer or purchaser.' He receives the legal title, not for
himself, but in trust, to collect and disburse to creditors.
All rights of action of the assignor pass to him for this
purpose; and to all suits against the assignor's estate, and
which are to affect the assets in his hands, he must. be a
party. This is the estate, and these are the functions, of
an ' ordinary administrator or personal representative. It
is frequently said of such an assignee that he represents
the creditors, as it is said of an administrator, where the
estate is insolvent, that he represents creditors, and, where
it is solvent, that he represents distributees; and in the.
.sense in which it is so said it is true. But by this is manifestly meant no more than that the representative's ultimate accountability is to the classes of persons who stand
to him in the relation of beneficiaries, who are ultimately
to receive the fruits of the trust he is administering,
whether it be the estate of a living or dead person or that
of a corporation. His right to maintain suits upon the
choses in action, passed to him from the assignor by the
assignment, obviously rests upon the fact that he represents
the assignor, in whom were vested originally the title and
right of action. This title and this right of action were
never vested in the creditors, and did not come to the
assignee from them.
Secondly, as to insolvency. Is insolvency of itself a
sufficient ground for the application of equitable set-off?
"It is deducible from the general scope of the authorities,"
saysMr. WATERMAN, I that insolvency has long been recognized as a distinct equitable ground of set-off."' Numerous authorities are cited by the learned author, but it is
1 Burrill, Assignm.,
391 ; Receivers v. Paterion Gas-Light Co., 23
N. J. Law, 283; Saunders v. Nevil, 2 Vern., 428, note i; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves., oo; Brown v. Heathcote, i Atk., 162; Clason v. Morris, io
Johns., 54o; Iurray v. Lylburn; 2 Johns., Ch. 443.
2 Wat. Set-Off, 432.
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not deemed useful or necessary to review them, as this
Court has repeatedly so held.'
Thirdly, as to the fact that the indebtedness on one
side is not due when the set-off is claimed. It seems to be
conceded by counsel for complainant that the indebtedness
from the party claiming the right of set-off is not due
would constitute no obstacle, as he might be allowed, if he
chose, to expedite payment of a debt due from himself,
without doing any injustice to the opposite party. But
it is earnestly insisted that it is quite different where it is
the debt against which the set-off is claimed that it is not
due; that in such case to allow the set-off, and thereby
compel payment of a debt not due, without the consent of
the debtor, is to violate the contract of the parties, and
work injustice to the debtor, whose demand is thus anticipated and collected before maturity. The argument is
persuasive, and not without the support of respectable
authority. Spaulding v. Backus,' Hannon v. Williams,'
Jordan v. Bank,' Lockwood v. Beckwith' and Wat. Set-Off'
-all seem to support this position, as do'other cases not
cited. The most of these and like cases seem to be,
and many of them are, expressly based on the principle
stated and illustrated in PothJ as follows: "I am your
debtor for six pipes of wine, of a particular vintage; you
are my debtor for six pipes of wine generally. I may
demand the six particular pipes, and therefore you cannot
offset the general debt for six pipes; but I may offset my
particular pipes, if I please, against yours, because I could
turn them out to you in payment of the general debt" It
is obvious that this illustration does not involye any principle of equitable set-off. It is only the statement of the
general principle, applicable, not only to the law of set-off,
' Brazelton v. Brooks, 2 Head) 193; Hough v. Chaffin, 4 Sneed,
238; Gregory v. Hasbrook, i Tenn., Ch. 220; Edminson v. Baxter, 4
Hayw. (Tenn.), Ir2; Richardson v. Parker, 2 Swan, 529; Moseby v.
Williamson, 5 Heisk., 287; Comfort v. Patterson, 2 Lea, 670; Machine
Co. v. Zackary, 2 Tenn., Ch. 478; Catron v. Cross, 3 Heisk., 584; Smith v.
Mosby, 9 Heisk, 5o; Fiedds v. Carney, 4 Baxt., 137.
2 122 Mass., 553.
"34 N.J. Eq., 255.
4 74 N.
., 467.
5 6 Mich., 168.
6
131, 132.
7 Obl., 59o.
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but to contracts as well, that an obligation payable in one
commodity cannot be paid in another without the consent
of the payee. At most, as applied to the case in hand,
it means that a debtor whose debt is due. has no right,
nothing more appearing, to set off against it a debt in his
favor, not due; but this is only stating a general rule of
legal set-off, everywhere conceded. 'The fact of insolvency
In'
"he 'absence of
of one of the parties'is not' involved. -,
insolvency, or some equivalent equity, it will not be anywhere contended that a debt not due can be set off against
a debt that is due, any more" than that six pipes of wine
generallycan beset off against six particular pipes of wine.
The case of Spaulding v. Backus,'su/ra, relied on f6r
the distinction under consideration, is not, strictly, an
authority for the position; for while the learned Court does
approve the distinction that a party cannot anticipate payment of an unmatured debt to himself, by setting off against
it a debt due from himself, presently payable, notwithstanding the insolvency of the complainant, the suit in that case
was by or for 'the benefit of an asignee by purchase, and
the real question was whether a debt owing by the defendant
to the assignor at the date of the assignment, though not
then due, was to be regarded as an equity so attached to
the assigned debt as to carry with it the right of set-off as
against the assignee with notice of assignor's insolvency.
The holding in the negative is not necessarily inconsistent
with the right of set-off as between the original parties, and
appears entirely consistent with the decisions of this Court,
that a right of set-off, to be so attached to the debt as to be
available against it in the hands of an assignee for Value,
must be complete and perfect at the date of the assignment.
Gatewood v. Denton,' Litterer v. Berr,1 Catron v. Cross,'
Lockwood v. Beckwith, Jordan v. Bank, Hannon v. Williams, do fairly hold the proposition contended for by complainant'scounseL The effect of the sections cited from Wat.
Set-Off is that the set-off will be allowed where the debt
not due is in favor of the party against whom the right of
set-off is asserted. It is only by implication that the learned
1 3 Read, 381.

S4 Lea, 193.

'

3

Heisk, 584.
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author can be treated as against the right in cases like the
present. We cannot agree with these authorities, either in
their reasoning or result. The question is, assuming the
insolvency of the party owing the unmatured debt, can his
debtor, when sued by the insolvent on a debt which is due,
set off against it, in equity, the unmatured debt, because of
the insolvency? We are of opinion that both reason and
the weight of authority answer in the affirmative.
In connection with the general principle of equity
before alluded to, that a set-off will be allowed when the
party appears in good conscience to be entitled to it, and
where no opposing equal or superior equity will be defeated
-and we are treating the case now upon the idea that it is
only the insolvent himself that is resisting-it must be
remembered that it is only where, for some reason, the law
cannot avail the party that equity intervenes at all. If both
parties were solvent, so that both debts might ultimately
be collected, the law would afford adequate relief, and no
injustice would be wrought to either party. The one could
not suffer by having to pay his own debt according to his
contract, if he could ultimately compel the other to pay his
debt according to his contract. But it is this very fact that,
if the one pays the debt due from him, he cannot compel
payment of the debt due to him, and will thereby suffer
irreparable loss, and his inability to protect himself by setoff at law because his debt is not due, that create his equity,
and the necessity for equitable relief. Does it lie in the
mouth of an insolvent to say that his contract is violated,
and thereby defeat so manifest an equity, when it is apparent
that he cannot himself perform that contract? Should a
court of conscience be.so overscrupulous of the rights of one
party to a contract as to refuse to permit a slight variance,
even as to him, when it can plainly see that thereby it will
wholly destroy the contract as to the other party? Technicalities are not to be so sweeping in their consequences.
This Court looks to the substance, and not to the shadow of
things. It is the very fact that the contract cannot be performed literally as made that calls upon the Court, ex &e-qto
et bono, to compel such substantial performance as is possi-
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ble. But it will be found, upon examination, that this
objection may be urged with equal force in almost, if not
in every case where the doctrine of equitable set-off has
been applied. Take, for example, the cause of a judgmeut on the one side and a simple contract debt on the
other. The judgment plaintiff is entitled to immediate execution and to collect his money at once. He does not have
to await the law's delay and the expense of litigation. He
has not only the right to demand his money, but to compel
payment at once by final process, before the defendant can
possibly obtain judgment, and place himself on equal footing in respect to the debt due him. He must await the
delay of legal proceedings while the plaintiff in thejudgment
may, in the meantime, in the exercise of not only a contract
right, but a contract right sanctioned by the final judgment
of the court, proceed to collection at once. And yet it has
never been considered that this right of a judgment plaintiff, if he is insolvent, stands in the way of equitable relief
to the other party by injunction and set-off, although it
cannot be said that there is here any less violation of the
clear legal right than there is in setting off a debt not due
against one that is due and payable.
The right of set-off in such and like cases is sanctioned
by many authorities. In Jones z. Robinson,' approved in
2 Wat. , it appeared that Jones had to his credit in bank a
deposit of 8924, at the time the bank failed and a receiver
was appointed, and the bank held Jones' note for $391.43,
which matured three days after the receiver was appointed.
Held set-off proper. In Fera z,.
Wickham,' reported in 15
N. Y. Supp., 892, the right of set-off was upheld in a case
like this, except that the parties were natural persons instead of corporations. In Schuler v. Israel' the Supreme
Court of the United States approves the same doctrine in a
garnishment proceeding; the syllabus, fairly supported by
the opinion, on this point being: "A garnishee has a right
to set up any defence against the attachment process which
126 Barb., 3io.
"2Corp., ,371.
.3Sup. Ct. N. Y., Oct., I891.
4 120 U. S., 5o6; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 64 6.
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he could have done against the debtor in the particular
action, and if the debtor be insolvent, and owes the garnishee on a note not due, for which he has no sufficient
security, he is not bound to risk the loss of his debt in
answer to the garnishee process." The facts appearing in
the answer of the garnishee, he was discharged. In Carr v.Hamilton' the same doctrine was applied between an insolvent life insurance company and the holder of an unmatured endowment policy, who was also indebted -to the
company for a loan, past due at the date of insolvency. In
Kentucky Flour Co.'s Assignee v. Merchants' Nat. Bank
(Ky.) 2 the doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in a case precisely similar to this. Referring to the
particular question now under consideration, the Court in
that case say: "It is unquestionably the law that, as between
individuals, the right of equitable set-off exists, although the
debt had not matured at the time of the insolvency. Ordinarily, of course, a debt not due cannot be set off against
one already due. To allow it would be to change the contract and advance the time of payment. But where the
party asserting the due debt is -a non-resident, or becomes
insolvent, then either of these conditions, i.Pso facto, gives
to the other party the right of equitable set-off, although
his debt had not matured when the debtor became insolvent or the conditions arose giving the right of equitable
set-off."
We conclude, therefore, that insolvency is a good
ground of equitable set-off, even where the indebtedness on
one side is not due, and that it makes no difference in
which party's favor is the unmatured debt. The supposed
hardship or injustice resulting from the anticipation of the
unmatured debt may and should be wholly obviated by
discounting it, or adding interest to the due debt for the
unexpired time of the debt not due, and in this way equalize the interest.
Fourthly, as to the effect of the statutes providing for
the equal and ratable distribution among creditors of the
assets of insolvents under general assignments, and of inI 129 U. S., 252; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 295.
2

13 S. W. Rep., 91o.
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solvent corporations.

Without elaborating this question,

it is sufficient to say we are of opinion that the position of
defendant is the correct one. Under a similar statute, in
reference to the estates of insolvent deceased persons, this
court held in Richardson v. Parker' that it is only the
balance remaining in favor of the estate, after all just settlements with debtors, that goes into the fund for distribution.
These balances are the "assets," to which the statute refers.
In that case a set-off was allowed to the debtor of an insolvent estate in a suit by the administrator.against him; and,
although it was a case of legal set-off purely, we are of
opinion the principle announced applies equally to the case
of equitable set-off. The Court has, in fact, shown a disposition to extend the principle to every case. It was so
expressly extended to insolvent corporations in Moseby v.
Williamson,' and to a general assignment by an insolvent
bank, in Comfort v'. Patterson.' It has also been recognized
that the same principle is applicable to the estates of bankrupts under national bankrupt laws,' and the principle has
been uniformly so applied by the bankrupt courts.5 It is
applicable to receivers of corporations, under State statutes .6
Also to receivers of insolvent national banks.' And this,
too, although the law of set-off is held not to have been
enlarged by either the bankrupt or national bank acts.
Sawyer v. Hoag,' Platt v. Bently, sufira.
In these and numerous like cases the Court proceed
upon the idea so well expressed by the New Jersey Court in
Receivers v. Gas-Light Co. : "The object of the act is to.
do equal justice to all the creditors, and equality is equity.
But equality of what and among whom? Clearly, of the1 2 Swan, 529.

2 5 Heisk., 287.

2

Lea, 670.

4 Richardson v. Parker, 2 Swan, 530; 5 Heisk., 287; 2 Tenn. Ch., 479'.

and cases there cited.
5 Drake v. Rollo, 4 N. B. R., 689; In re City Bank of Savings, 6 N. B.
re H. Petrie, 7. N. B. R., 332; 2 Vern. 428, note i.
R.. 71; hli
6Receivers v. Gas-Light Co., 23 N. J. Law, 283; Miller v. Receiver,
i Paige, 444; McLaren v. Pennington, i Paige, 112.
Platt v. Bently (N. Y.), Iz Amer. Law Reg. (N. S.), 171; Wait. Insolv. Corp., 549.
U. S. Sup. Ct., 1873; -17 Wall., 6io.
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assets of the bank among the creditors of the bank. In
cases of cross-indebtedness, the assets of the bank consist
only of the balance of the accounts. That is all the fund
which the bank itself would have had to satisfy its creditors
in case no receiver had been appointed. And there is no
equality and no equity in putting a debtor of the bank, who
has a just and legal set-off as against the corporation, in a
worse position, and the creditors in a better position, by
the failure of the bank and the appointment of receivers."'
In that case, although the debt to the bank was not due
at the time of failure and the appointment of receivers, the
defendant was allowed, in a suit brought after maturity, to
set it off against a debt due by him to the bank at the date
of failure.
These considerations and authorities are equally conclusive against the argument of complainant that the rights
of the parties were fixed at the date of the assignment. It
is true they were fixed, in the sense that a debtor of the
assignor could not thereafter purchase or acquire a debt
against the assignor, and set it off against .his own debt to
the assignor.2 Unless the debt was held at the date of
assured insolvency, in case of a corporation, or at the date
of the assignment of an insolvent debtor, or the death of
an insolvent decedent, it cannot be set off.' If the estate
be solvent, the set-off will be allowed, although acquired
after the death of plaintiff's intestate.4
The second question presented by the agreed case is
whether the legal right of set-off existed when the suit was
commenced. The indebtedness on both sides being then
due and mutual, under the rules herein announced, it would
seem that the only question remaining is whether the agreed
case is to be treated as, in effect, a suit to recover the deposit. We are of opinion that it must be so treated. We
do not so hold simply because the assignee appears as complainant on the record and in the agreed statement. That
IMcGinnis v. Allen, 2 Swan, 645.
5 Heisk., 287 ; 2 Swan,
Swan, 645.
4 23 N. J. Law, 294, 295.
2

3 2

529 ; 9

Heisk., 501, 506; 8 Baxt., 4o8.
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is a circumstance, it is true; and, the case being a controversy between parties, one or the other must be regarded
as the actor or complainant. Looking to the substance of
the controversy and relief sought, it is seen that the assignee asserts the right to recover the deposit, in the first
instance, or, if not, then to have the Court declare its right
to charge up the amount of the deposit to the bank as so
much cash paid on its pro rala, which is manifestly the
same thing, as the statement shows the bank will be entitled to receive more than that amount in tny event. On
the other hand, the bank is seeking no decree at the hands
of the Court, further than to have declared valid its previous act applying the deposit as a payment on the notes,
or its right now to have it so applied; either right being
sufficient to repel the assignee. We think, therefore, that
the case is in effect a suit by the assignee to recover the
deposit, commenced on the 4 th day of December, 1891, and
therefore that the Chancellor's decree, in its result, is supported by the bank's legal, as well as equitable, right of
set-off; the original equitable right having ripened into
and become a legal one before the suit was commenced.'
The Chancellor's decree is therefore affirmed, and the assignee, out of the assets in its hands, will pay costs.
SET-OFF IN INSOLVENCY.
It was remarked in a recent case,
with reference to the doctrine of setoff, that " Well-defined and easy of
comprehension as the doctrine is,
however, its application to the varying state of facts which arise is
attended with the same degree of
difficulty that attends the administration of other plain legal principles, under unusual circumstances."
(Per BUIER, J., in Yardley v.
Clothier, 49 Fed. Rep., 337.) NO

state of facts presents greater difficulty to the application of this doctrine, and none has given rise to
greater diversity ofopinion amongst
juridical writers as to its legal effect
than the insolvency of one of the
parties. It is not in every case,
however, where one of the parties
is insolvent, that this result follows,
as, in its general features, insolvency presents no obstacle which
interferes with the application of

I Keith v. Smith, i Swan, 92; 'lill & V. Code, 3628, subsection i.
Mill & V. Code, 3628, provides: "The defendant may plead, by way of
set-off or cross-action : (i) Mutual demands held by the defendant against
the plaintiff at the time of action brought, and matured when offered in
sett-off," etc.

NASHVILLE TRUST CO. V. THE BANK.
this doctrine. Since the earliest
bankrupt statute, that of 4 and 5
Anne, Ch. 17, there has been universally contained in that class of
laws a provision that where there
are mutual debts or mutual credits
between the parties, the balance of
the accounts shall constitute the
true debt and shall be alone recovered.
Prior to the existence of these
statutes, however, courts of equity
were accustomed to exercise the
doctrine of equitable set-off where,
owing to the peculiar state of facts,
it would have been inequitable to
have permitted a creditor to have
recovered the full amount of his
claim without reference to any cross
demand: Van Wagoner v. Patterson Co., 23 NJ. Law, 283,1 Modern,
215.

Since the enactment of those statutes the courts have been accustomed to apply the doctrine of
equitable set-off independently of
the statutes, where its non-application would cause a result contrary
to the universally accepted ideas of
equity.
It is well settled that where a
remedy at law is adequate and complete, the fact that it may prove ineffectual by reason of insolvency of
the defendant, confers no jurisdiction upon a court of equity.
But in the distribution of the
estates of insolvents, there is a disposition upon the part of many of
the courts to hold that mere insolvency of a person, without the support of other circumstances, is
sufficient to permit a court to exercise its equitable powers of set-off,
and, as shown by the principal case,
they have gone so far as to permit a
debt not due to be set off against
one already matured. Upon this
point much conflict exists, how-

ever. and the question is not yet
free from doubt in. those jurisdictions where there has been no express declaration upon the subject.
Three classes of cases have arisen,
calling for the application of this
doctrine in cases of insolvency:
I. Where at the time of insolvency both the debt due to the insolvent and that due from him had
fully matured.
II. Where at the time of the insolvency the indebtedness owing by
the insolvent was fully due and payable, but the debt due to him had
not matured.
III. Where at the time of insolvency the indebtedness to the insolvent was due and payable, but
that owing by him had not matured.
(i) The first of these cases, where
both debts are due and payable at
the time of insolvency, presents no
difficulty. It will be observed that
in those States where bankrupt laws
are in force, the provision that
where mutual debts and mutual
credits exist, the balance of accounts
shall constitute the true debt, covers
this case completely. Where no
such statutes exist the courts will,
in the exercise of their chancery
powers, permit only the balance due
to be recovered under these circumstances: Light v. Leininger, 8 Pa.,
403 ; McDonald v. Webster, 2 Mass.,
498.
The debt which it is proposed to
set off must, however, be one which
was owing to the defendant at the
time of insolvency. The acquisition, subsequent to that time, of a
claim owing to another person at
the time ofinsolvencygives no right
of set-off. Irons v. Irons, 5 R. I.,
624; Northampton Bank v. Balliet,
8 W. & S., 317 ; Pass v. McRea, 36
Mliss., 143.
To the general rule, that where
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both debts are payable at the time
of insolvency set-off is allowed,
there are exceptions which arise out
of the peculiar relations prevailing
between the parties.
A depositor in an insolvent savings bank, who is also a debtor to
the institution for money borrowed
from it, is not entitled to offset the
amount of his deposit against his
indebtedness. These decisions are
based upon the ground that the
debt owed by the depositor belongs
in fact to all the depositors, but
neither the bank nor the depositors
owe him anything more than his
just proportion of the assets owned
by the bank: Hannon v. Williams,
34 N. J. Law, 255; Stockton v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 5 Stewart
] q. (N. J.), 163; Osborne v. Byrne,
43 Conn., 155. The same exception has also been made in the case
of members of a mutual insurance
company, the courts holding that a
member of such company cannot
setoff any indebtedness of the company to him in a suit against him
to recover unpaid assessments: Hillier v. Allegheny Mut. Ins. Co., 3
Pa. St., 70; Lawrence v. Nelson,
21 N. Y., r58; Sawyer v. Hoag, 17
Wall, 6Io.
(2) The second class of cases,
where the debt from the insolvent
is due at the time of insolvency, but
the debt to him matures subsequently, is free from difficulty. In
the absence of controlling statutory
regulations, where at the time of
insolvency the proposed set-off was
due, it has always been allowed, irrespective of the fact whether the
debt to the insolvent had then matured or not: Jordan v. Sherlock,
84 Pa.,;366; Skiles v. Houston, iio
Pa., 254; Yardley v. Clothier, 49
Fed. Rep., 377; Houston v. Nicholson, 4 Camp., 342; Van Wagoner v.

Patterson Co., 23 N. J. L., 283;
Platt v. Bentley, ii Am. Law Reg.,
N. S., 172; Smith v. Felton, 43 N
Y., 19; In re Receiver of Middle
District Bank, r Paige, 58.5; Miller
v. Receiver of Franklin Bank, I
Paige, 444; Hade v. MeVey, 31
Ohio St., 231 ; American Bank v.
Wall, 56 Me., 167; Colt z.Brown,
12 Gray, 233.
To this rule an exception has
been made in the cases of insolvency of national banks. In Armstrong zr.
Scott, 36 Fed. -Rep., 63; it
was held that in such cases a depositor could not set off-his deposit
against hisindebtednessto thebank,
maturing after insolvency, as it was
prohibited by Section 5242 of the
Revised Statutes, which makes all
payment of money by a national
bank to its shareholders brereditors,
after the comnpletion of-its insolvency, or in contemplation thereof,
"with a viewto preventtheapplication of its assets in the manner
prescribed by this chapter, or with
a view to the preference of one
creditor to another, except in the
payment of its circulating notes,"
utterly null and void. "SAGn, J.,
said: "The unmistakdble force
and meaning of the lawis to place
all creditors upon the same footing
of equality. When the plaintiff
was appointed receiver, the defendant was in the list ofunseeured
depositors, to whom payment, the
bank being insolventi. was prohibited. The defendant had then
no right of set-off, nor-any equity
against its note, not then matured,
which had passed to the receiver."
To the same effect is Stephens v.
Schuchman, 32 Mo. App., 333.
The same question came before
the Circuit Court of -the United
States, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Yardley v. Clothier, 49
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Fed. Rep., 337, and in an opinion
by BUTLER, J., in which ACHESO-,
J., concurred, a conclusion 'directly
opposite to that of Armstrong v.
Scott, suphra, was reached. That
case was carefully examined, but
was not followed, the Court being
of opinion that the allowance of
set-off would not create any preference among creditors prohibited
by Section 5242 of the Revised
Statutes. To the same effect is
Platt, Receiver, v. Bentley, ii Am.
L. Reg., N. S., 17r. These decisions seem to be more in accord
with the current of authorities
than Armstrong v. Scott, stifira.
In this class of cases an attempt
has sometimes been made by the
debtor of an insolvent estate, whose
debt was due at the time of insolvency, to restrain the representative
of the insolvent from disposing of
a note or other indebtedness held
by the insolvent at the time of insolvency, but not then payable.
In Lindsay z. Jackson, 2 Paige,
58r, in May, 1831, the complainants
gave to the defendant two negotiable notes for the sum of $1r,5oo each,
payable in six months, with in:
terest. About the same time the
defendant became indebted to the
complainant, on an acceptance of
$4,000, payable on June i3, 183. A
few days before this acceptance became due, the defendants became
insolvent. In July, 1831, the complainants filed their bill to restrain
the defendants from transferring
the notes, and praying that the
amount to become due thereon
might be set off or applied in part
satisfaction of the $4,ooo due on the
acceptance.
The injunction was
granted.
Although in this case
the debt of the complainants was
not due at the time of insolvency,
it is doubtful whether it can be

considered as an authority to that
extent, as the question was not discussed. The debt to the complainants was due at the time of suit,
and it was expressly stated that if
the debt to the complainants was
not due it could not be set off. No
distinction was made between the
time of insolvency and the time of
suit. That this is the extent of
Lindsay v. Jackson as an authority
is shown by Smith v. Felton, 43
N. Y., 19.
In In re Commercial Bank, I
Chan. App., 538, a different conclusion was reached. In that case the
debt from the insolvent bank to
Smith, Fleming & Co. was due at
the time of insolvency. The bank
held notes of Smith, Fleming &
Co., which were not due until some
subsequent time. The Court refused
to restrain the official liquidator
from transferring the notes, although it was acknowledged that
if the notes had been held by the
official liquidator until maturity,
Smith, Fleming & Co. could have
set off the amount of their deposit
against the amount of the note.
(3) The right to set off the debt of
an insolvent which matures subsequent to insolvency, against a debt
due to him at that time, is involved
in so much doubt as to fully warrant the statement in the principal
case, that "the cases are in hopeless and irreconcilable conflict on
many of the points involved. An
effort to reconcile them would be
futile."
At law, insolvency has no effect
whatever upon the question of setoff; but. in equity it has always
been recognized as allowing its application, either when connected
with other circumstances, or where
the claims are due, but the damages
are not liquidated. Whether in-
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solvency alone, without the presence of other facts conferring jurisdiction upon a court of equity,
will warrant the application of the
doctrine of equitable set-off, is a
question where great diversity of
opinion exists.
In the principal case, after a careful consideration of the subject, the
Court arrived at the conclusion that
insolvency alone is sufficientground
to permit a court to exercise its
powers of equitable set-off, and
that it would be inequitable and
unjust to compel a person occupying'the dual position of debtor and
creditor of an insolvent estate to
pay his indebtedness to the estate
in full and receive only a pro ratl
share of his claim against the
estate, simply because at the time
of insolvency the indebtedness
against the insolvent had not
matured.
This doctrine has received much
support, and is applied in Aldrich
v. Campbell, 4 Gray, 284; McDonald v. Webster, 2 Mass., 498;
Bigelow v. Folger, 2 Metc., 255;
Bemis v. Smith, Ibid., 194; Denmon v. Boylston Bank, 5 Cush.,
194;
Berrigan v. Pearsall, 46
Conn., 276; Carter v. Compton, 79
Ind., 37; Clark v. Hawkins, 5 R. I.,
219; Green v. National Security
Bank, 6 V. N. C. (Pa.), 399.
In Campbell v. Aldrich, supra,
THOMAS, J., says: "This case is
not to be determined upon the
technical rules of set-off, but upon
the principles regulating the settlement of insolvent estates, whether
of persons living or deceased. The
settlements with such estates are
final, and all mutual demands are
to be balanced. Claims not liquidated and debts, though not absolutely due, though payable in
the future, are to be included. The

balance found upon such adjustment is the only debt remaining.
In the case of an insolvent estate of
one deceased, all claims existing at
the time of the death are to be set
off; in the case of an insolvent
estate of a person living, all claims
existing at the time of the first
publication of the notice of the
issuing of the warrant may likewise be set off." In Greene v. National Security Bank, sitira, ELCOCK, J., said: "If any equity springs
from the fact of Stewart's insolvency in favor of the bank, then it
can hold, or stop, or defalcate, or set
off, or defend to that extent. The
relationship between the bank and
its depositor or customer is simply that of debtor and creditor, for
no ear-mark follows the deposit
and the banker uses the same for
the general purposes of his business. The bank becomes a creditor of the maker of the notes when
it discounts the same, and his
debtor when he makes the deposits.
The maker's debt is created when
he issues his notes; it is true that
the time to maturity is his right
before payment can be demanded,
but the debt exists from the time
of issuing the note. The maker
has an undoubted right to waive
this time and anticipate it by payment. Where a maker becomes
insolvent and makes a general
assignment for the benefit of his
creditors, is it unreasonable to say
that he waives further time upon
his credit and, expressing his insolvency or inability to pay them
at niaturity, by such act matures
all his debts? He has the power;
do not his acts show its exercise?
Time on his note is of no further
importance to him, and his other
creditors have no greater rights than
he has granted them."

